K8y Our Camera app does support HDR+ on Pixels along with Night mode. It's not quite the same. Some people prefer the more natural look of pictures from our app and others prefer Pixel Camera. Pixel Camera does have a lot more features but we're working on improving our Camera app.
phone-company
- Joined Jun 12, 2024
GrapheneOS version 2025030300 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025030300
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
gk7ncklxlts99w1 GrapheneOS is definitely not the most secure OS if you don't limit it to user-facing general purpose smartphone, laptop or desktop OS. GrapheneOS is easily the most private and secure general purpose smartphone OS. The competition is iOS, none of these products. It's certainly more secure than everything you've listed here. iOS and AOSP are far more secure than any traditional desktop operating systems. We would simply say GrapheneOS is more secure than iOS in lockdown mode when looking at the whole picture despite iOS having a more secure base for the kernel for now. iOS has a lot of merits, but these things don't.
Solarin by Sirin Labs
We don't have all of the details but we're confident it's less hardened than GrapheneOS and focused more on performative things such as the IDS you mention.
Murena One, which uses /e/OS, a fork of LineageOS.
Highly insecure hardware and software. Massively worse than the Android Open Source Project. Neither good for privacy or security. It lags so far behind on patches and rolls back security so much along with having a bunch of poorly implemented, privacy invasive services as part of it.
Purism Librem 5
These are highly insecure devices without basic security patches and security features implemented. The OS doesn't have a basic application security model or other protections. Audio recording kill switch isn't implemented correctly and that's the one which could be more than a near useless frill.
K-iPhone
Looks like an iPhone with device management and other apps set up. Very sketchy. Just compare to a regular iPhone instead, it's the same hardware and OS, and avoids all the sketchy stuff.
Blackberry
They don't make smartphones anymore. They licensed out their brand to others to make highly insecure ones without proper support. Their hardening was less impactful than the security features missing from not having the major OS upgrades. Their Android smartphones were much less secure, not more secure. Whether or not their prior OS was secure is an open question since it didn't get much research. Using a microkernel is very good in theory, but it can be less secure in practice.
GrapheneOS version 2025030100 released:
https://grapheneos.org/releases#2025030100
See the linked release notes for a summary of the improvements over the previous release.
- Edited
In April 2024, Pixels shipped a partial implementation of our January 2024 proposal for firmware-based reset attack protection. Fastboot mode now zeroes RAM before enabling USB. This successfully wiped out the After First Unlock state exploit capabilities of two commercial exploit tools.
Several other improvements were made based on our January 2024 vulnerability reports and proposals including an implementation of wiping data before rebooting when a wipe is triggered. We shipped an improved version of this for our duress PIN/password feature before the feature shipped for Android.
We made massive improvements in GrapheneOS to defend against these attacks since January 2024.
For ARMv9 devices, we greatly improved our hardware memory tagging implementation in hardened_malloc, deployed it for the Linux kernel allocators and greatly expanded the use of PAC and BTI across the OS.
We replaced our decade old feature for blocking new USB peripherals while locked with a greatly expanded and far more secure feature. The new approach blocks USB-C connections and USB-C data at a hardware level with expanded software-based blocking as a fallback (https://grapheneos.org/features#usb-c-port-and-pogo-pins-control).
We started deploying RANDSTRUCT for the kernel, which will eventually be used to have multiple possible struct memory layouts for each device model chosen randomly at boot. Our work on reducing kernel attack surface also continued. We plan to focus more on Linux kernel security going forward.
Our locked device auto-reboot feature from 2021 was replaced with a more secure approach preventing bypasses via crashes (https://grapheneos.org/features#auto-reboot). It also avoids chain reboots without introducing a security weakness which makes low timer values such as the minimum 10 minutes far more usable.
We shipped our 2-factor fingerprint unlock feature planned since 2015 (https://grapheneos.org/features#two-factor-fingerprint-unlock). It allows people to avoid reliance on secure element security with a strong passphrase while keeping convenience. Fingerprint + scrambled PIN also defends well against being recorded unlocking.
We recently added an implementation of zeroing RAM at boot in the kernel to match what fastboot mode does to cover anything not previously zeroed on free. Several more major improvements specifically against the physical data extraction attack vector are planned. For example, we plan to add a toggle for essentially toggling off Device Encrypted data.
L8437 The network location provider uncovered an upstream Android bug causing system_server crashes. It's why the release didn't move beyond the Alpha channel. We've fixed it and it will be included in today's release which will hopefully be able to go to Beta and then also Stable within a couple days.
- Edited
angela there are real world instances of tails users who didn't have a VPN being compromised because of correlations between ISP packets sent and data received while using compromused Tor nodes and users who had VPNs prior to connecting to Tor were not compromised in the same way.
True, but we are talking about sending your true real-life location here. I would strongly advise against mixing real-life activity such as your real-life location with anonymous activity such as what you would typically send through a VPN or Tor. If you use the same VPN for sending your real-life location, and for your anonymous activity, you are revealing to the other end of the VPN exactly where the person doing that anonymous activity is located, ruining all anonymity a VPN alone would give. Same if the location queries are sent out through the same Tor exit as the anonymous traffic, which of course can be prevented, but still.
I think there are very good and strong reason to only send queries regarding your real-life location out through the direct internet connection, as your direct internet connection already is approximately tied to your real-life location (if it is a residential connection, or through cellular triangulation). And then only use VPN and Tor for the activity you actually want to keep private, and isolated from real-life location.
phone-company No the purpose of an imsi catcher is also location tracking via tracking the imsi/imei trough different cells.
K8y I am not sure what networking events you attend but I always bring an old phone to any security conference or a gig like a concert or anything. First of all if I lose it or it's getting stolen no problem, sim replacement and you're good to go. Second I really don't have to worry about any skids doing stupid shit just for fun and giggles.
Don't fix what's not broken.
angela does this work when someone isn't using a cellular network or WiFi?
It would be nice if one day these requests can be routed through VPN and then Tor (Port 9050) for those of us who don't trust anyone ever.
What do you think is routing / transporting your packets in this combination? I am really not sure if you're trolling here, or you really have no clue how any of this works but watched one too many doomsday yt vids.
Fingerprint+PIN instead of long passphrase
You are not supposed to put the same pin you use in 2FA for the passphrase..loopdubs It's perfectly fine to use GrapheneOS this way. You're still greatly improving your privacy and security. We want GrapheneOS to be usable by everyone as a regular device including with mainstream apps and services. Using a bunch of Google apps and services should work fine, and you can do a much better job protecting your privacy from them with GrapheneOS. Sandboxed Google Play services / sandboxed Google Play Store are the same as other regular apps which is a huge benefit for you. Storage Scopes, Contact Scopes and other privacy features also still benefit you. It's perfectly fine to choose how much you want to sacrifice for privacy and perhaps gradually work towards using other apps and services. That's largely not up to you but rather alternatives to their apps and services getting better until you consider them good enough to use instead.
phone-company You don't need to clear cache yourself. Your battery consumption is due to the the apps you're using, how you have them set up and your network along with your overall configuration. The changes are not due to this update and we know that.
GrapheneOS I guess it's Daniel speaking for GrapheneOS.
We the people who support and love the GrapheneOS project understand that you are tired of all this harassment.
Some people don't like the truth because it can reveal all the lies they're spreading around them.
As of today, GrapheneOS is the only serious hardening project based on AOSP after the retirement of the one-man behind DivestOS.
Michael Bazzell a former FBI agent believe that GrapheneOS is the optimal operating system for a mobile device, so do I.
In the Android support matrix from the leak of April 2024, Cellebrite the world leader in mobile phone data extraction specifically mentionned GrapheneOS and we know what it means.
You don't need to give a response to Braxman. Use your precious time to focus on GrapheneOS and the people you love.
By waisting your time with them, you are also worsening your health time after time and you don't want that, you don't need it.
314 This was not at all secure and is far worse than simply using a random 6-8 digit PIN with PIN scrambling enabled. What you're proposing implementing doesn't work as a way to have a secure lockscreen and secure encryption.
Yep, sorry, you are right about the patents.
Well I will try to describe it because I was not able to upload a picture.
- The user had to choose a picture of his/ her preference and a specific point on it.
- The user had to also choose a number from 1-9.
- During unlocking, the chosen image would appear on the screen, with a matrix of random numbers on top of the picture. - With his/ her thumb the user could move the matrix to any direction so as the number of preference (from the moving matrix) would meet the specific point chosen on the picture. When the number was on the point the device would unlock.
I hope you understand what I am writing.
- Edited
DeletedUser127 I thought it did. After reading your reply I went to double check and sensors wasnt allowed. That fixed it. Thanks.
Dito here on an P8: no change regarding battery drain
max is 15% per day (bad indoor connection to the mobile provider; mobile data/wifi/BT usually off)Haven't noticed increased battery usage on 6a.
