PiNizz-Va-J-J

You're posting a lot of highly inaccurate speculation and claims. Not clear why you think devices don't have data extracted. Cellebrite has been around offering this for years and their tools are widely used around the world by governments, not only for law enforcement. There are several other forensic data extraction companies with widely used tools, mainly MSAB (XRY) and Magnet Forensics (Graykey). The tools are widely available and widely used. They are not only used in special circumstances but rather as standard operating procedure around the world. It's also not limited to law enforcement. These are not the only type of widely used commercial exploit tools, but remote exploit tools are much more rarely used and not generally going to be widely distributed / accessible to low-level cops, border guards, etc.

I ask also, because i heared a few times, that the police is not able to access an iphone 6 with an 8digit passcode.

This is generally the case with an iPhone 12 or later / Pixel 6 or later if the device is turned off. That's shown by the Cellebrite Premium documentation we posted here and is still the case in the January 2025 Cellebrite Premium documentation. If the device isn't in the Before First Unlock state, they can get all the data with Cellebrite Premium for either an iPhone or Pixel regardless of the lock method unless it's a Pixel running GrapheneOS. We have an 18 hour locked device auto-reboot timer by default and Apple recently added a 72 hour timer in October 2024 for iOS 18.1 likely at least indirectly inspired by our feature since several of them followed us on Twitter (may not be active there anymore) and the idea was propagated around everywhere after we shipped it in June 2021.

      GrapheneOS If the device isn't in the Before First Unlock state, they can get all the data with Cellebrite Premium for either an iPhone or Pixel regardless of the lock method

      Don't they still need to brute force the PIN or passphrase, even if not throttled by the secure element/enclave?

          Titan_M2 If they exploit the OS while in the After First Unlock state, they get all the data from profiles that are not at rest with the exception of a small amount protected by hardware keystore keys set up to require the device being unlocked, etc.

            GOS I was wondering how mac os would fair against cellebrite, would BFU on mac os make any difference in ease to gain access? I was also gonna ask as I saw in an earlier post you mentioned mac os's "brute force" security was improving and could be nearly compared to an early phone model. Do you see a future where mac os has "brute force" security that can rival modern iphone's? (I know sandboxing is an issue currently) Thanks.

              jamesman3932 The hardware and firmware security is similar to iOS but credential-based encryption is opt-in and the software is significantly less secure. It should already have largely comparable brute force protection to iOS. It is easier to exploit it though and it doesn't have the recently added locked device auto-reboot feature added in iOS 18.1 in October 2024.

                  14 days later

                  • BBozo

                    • Post #122

                    I wonder if the iOS vulnerability used by celebrite has been fixed in 18.3.1. Apple’s description of the patch is that it is related to accessibility:

                    A physical attack may disable USB Restricted Mode on a locked device. Apple is aware of a report that this issue may have been exploited in an extremely sophisticated attack against specific targeted individuals.

                      Bozo Although we wouldn't know until we have updated leaks from Cellebrite, it kind of sounds like both Apple and Google might now this past month have patched the vulnerabilities Cellebrite were exploiting. Maybe.

                      If that is the case, GrapheneOS probably loses one of its major sales points of being the only OS to resist these attacks. Even if GrapheneOS is still doing it better, by actual hardening to prevent whole classes of vulnerabilities, not just fixing a specific vulnerability.

                      I am actually a bit surprised why neither Apple nor Google have fixed this earlier. For companies like them, surely, it shouldn't be that hard to get access to the Cellebrite software, one way or another.

                          ryrona Apple appears to have patched a bypass for their USB restricted mode mitigation. They do not appear to have stopped Cellebrite exploiting USB when it's still enabled. Look up the details of USB restricted mode, it's a weaker variant of what we're doing for USB attack surface reduction and is off by default so it doesn't help most users.

                            There was a recent upstream Linux kernel patch for one of the Linux kernel vulnerabilities being exploited. We don't know which company/government was exploiting it. It's unlikely that each of these groups is using the same USB peripheral vulnerability and they're almost certainly each aware of at least one other vulnerability they can use. There are a lot of USB peripheral drivers including ones with very low quality code.

                            It seems as long as apple does not do a similar approach as GOS, it will never be in the same league. Apple keeps the usb port wide open 60 minutes after last lock, regardless if you toggled usb accessories off.

                            What Cellbrite tool are used for a Physical Extraction (with user consent)? Physical Analyzer?

                              HarryB Cellebrite UFED is the forensic acquisition tool, Cellebrite Physical Analyzer is the forensic processing tool. UFED is for extracting devices while PA reads/examines the extraction.

                                5 days later

                                A few months ago, I was given a "behind the scenes" tour of a US forensics lab. Part of this included viewing their Faraday vault and mobile extraction solutions. I didn't pry too much but was told that unless the device was setup improperly (bad screen lock, only fingerprint, etc), "modern pixels running GOS" were not in their scope. I offered to have them test my phone but unfortunately all their units (confirmed cellebrite, unsure on further details) were being used.

                                GrapheneOS Can you point to a fuller explanation of the fingerprint+code unlock?

                                My fingers are quite calloused (I assume that's the reason) and frequently fail on fingerprint unlock.

                                I'd hate for this to be the unchangeable default method of accessing my device. I'd be locked out 80% of the time.

                                    GrapheneOS when you say 'support for the new iOS versions', do you mean AFU only?

                                    I have a few questions. Apologies if this has been stated already... (if it has, pls refer me to the post)..

                                    1. What access, if any, does celebrite have to data on an iOS with 8 (or more) digit alpha numeric, 10 login limit, in BFU?
                                    2. What iOS versions is data able to be accessed (as per above question).
                                    3. When the matrix refers to BFU - Yes, BF - no. What is the BFU exploit that is happening? and is this exploit available for 8 (or more) alphanumeric login in BFU?
                                    4. Are there any devices that celebrite can access the data when in BFU mode with 8 (or more) alpha numeric passcode?
                                    5. can we access the latest celebrite support data anywhere?

                                      n2gwtl It depends what you mean by Linux. If you mean traditional desktop Linux distributions, they're much worse than macOS which is much worse than iOS. We'd say that the stock Pixel OS is slightly worse than iOS overall right now but GrapheneOS does much better. Please bear in mind ChromeOS, the stock Pixel OS and GrapheneOS are Linux distributions too.

                                          GrapheneOS I should be more specific. I have been on the market for a new computer for some time, and I cannot decide between another macos laptop or the framework desktop. I have looked at this site which covers full disk encryption, TPM 2.0, systemd-boot, and secure boot. I thought if I enabled all of this on Fedora, I would have a reasonably secure system without all of the Apple privacy concerns.

                                              n2gwtl Fedora on a Framework laptop will provide essentially zero physical security with no protection against data extraction after you've entered the encryption passphrase. It will only protect your data while the device is powered off. macOS on a Mac will provide far better physical protection. macOS will also be harder to exploit.

                                              TPM 2.0, systemd-boot, and secure boot

                                              The implementation of secure boot and attestation by both that hardware and the OS (Fedora) is incomplete and insecure. It provides no real world security benefits. It neither provides against attacker persistence after exploitation or physical attackers. It's work towards real security features without getting to the point that it actually works. It's similar to locking your front door on a house where there are no walls, just a wooden frame people can step through. It does not deter an attacker.