Thanks for the response! I understand your point about the 5 failed attempt limit, but in practice (as a GOS user myself), you can do 3 failed attempts, press the standby button, and then do another 3 failed attempts before the device forces you to use your PIN or passphrase.
This effectively allows 6 failed attempts in total, which has been the existing behavior in GrapheneOS. My suggestion is that the new 2FA PIN feature could be enhanced by making it configurable as a fallback after a cumulative number of failed attempts (e.g., after 3). This would allow users with lower threat models to avoid having to always use both fingerprint and the 2FA PIN for every unlock, while still maintaining robust security protections. And those who wish to always have the 2FA PIN could still do that.
Would love to hear thoughts on whether this could be implemented as part of the new 2FA system or what your views on that are. I do not see it defeating the purpose entirely as you describe it.