coffeefun I'm glad we could help!
I have a couple of questions about your conclusions:
coffeefun Con: Google Play increases attack surface, and creates an extra attack channel via notifications. Solution: n/a
How do we arrive to this conclusion? What attack are you referring to here?
coffeefun Con: Google Play can see a list of installed apps on that profile. But, so can all other apps in that profile. Solution: Install Google Play on secondary profile(s), if that provides other actual benefits (e.g., having two sets of contacts).
Keep in mind that GrapheneOS has been implementing features that make it easier for you to provide more granular control of your data to apps even without needing profiles. An excellent example of this is Storage Scopes. GrapheneOS also plans to have Contact Scopes as well in order to limit what contacts an app will have access to. I thought I'd mention that since you specifically brought up contacts etc. :)
coffeefun Con: Google Play can communicate with other apps via mutual consent, and those apps can leak data to Google that way. Solution: 1) Install Google Play on secondary profile(s) away from sensitive apps; 2) In profile with Google Play, choose apps that are unlikely to willfully sharing data with Google (i.e., FOSS apps, privacy-friendly apps).
I just want to make it clear (I think you understand this, but I want to make sure) that this mutual communication is not in any way limited to Play Services etc. It's something that all apps are fundamentally capable of doing. If you think that one of your apps that houses sensitive data might be abusing this communication channel to pass on private data that you've trusted it with, perhaps the bigger issue isn't Sandboxed Google Play, but the app you're trusting with your data in the first place. Just some food for thought!