sustained5314 it scans for Wi-Fi access points, so you need to either keep Wi-Fi on, or turn on always on Wi-Fi scanning which allows apps with the precise location or nearby devices permissions to scan for Wi-Fi access points even when Wi-Fi is off.
In the near future, cell towers will be supported for getting a rough location estimate and it can use that if Wi-Fi is unavailable.
GrapheneOS
Thanks for clarifying.
First off all, thank you for the amazing update! I have a couple of question regarding some of the changes.
GrapheneOS got a new log with some strings which I didn't see before. Maybe this could help
type: logcat
osVersion: google/husky/husky:15/AP4A.250205.002/2025022700:user/release-keys
package: app.grapheneos.networklocation:35, targetSdk 35
buffers: main,system,crash,events,kernel
level: verbose
--------- beginning of events
02-28 10:33:50.732 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:38): avc: denied { read } for comm="networklocation" name="u:object_r:odsign_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=293 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:odsign_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.736 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:39): avc: denied { getattr } for comm="networklocation" path="/apex/apex-info-list.xml" dev="tmpfs" ino=91 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:apex_info_file:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.864 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:43): avc: denied { read } for comm="main" name="u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=114 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.864 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:44): avc: denied { read } for comm="main" name="u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=114 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.864 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:45): avc: denied { read } for comm="main" name="u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=114 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.864 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:47): avc: denied { read } for comm="main" name="u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=114 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.864 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:48): avc: denied { read } for comm="main" name="u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=114 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:build_attestation_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.936 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:55): avc: denied { read } for comm="binder:2031_2" name="u:object_r:qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=317 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
02-28 10:33:50.936 2031 2031 I auditd : avc=type=1400 audit(0.0:56): avc: denied { read } for comm="binder:2031_2" name="u:object_r:qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop:s0" dev="tmpfs" ino=317 scontext=u:r:platform_app:s0:c512,c768 tcontext=u:object_r:qemu_sf_lcd_density_prop:s0 tclass=file permissive=0 app=app.grapheneos.networklocation
--------- beginning of main
02-28 10:34:18.169 2031 4577 D CompatChangeReporter: Compat change id reported: 312399441; UID 10180; state: ENABLED
02-28 10:34:18.183 2031 4577 D TrafficStats: tagSocket(71) with statsTag=0xffffffff, statsUid=-1We'll provide database downloads to support offline network location.
Can you already tell in which format the offline database will be available?
phone-company there are real world instances of tails users who didn't have a VPN being compromised because of correlations between ISP packets sent and data received while using compromused Tor nodes and users who had VPNs prior to connecting to Tor were not compromised in the same way. It might help to not say anything if you have no idea what youre talking about and live in a bubble of righteous ignorance.
angela there are real world instances of tails users who didn't have a VPN being compromised because of correlations between ISP packets sent and data received while using compromused Tor nodes and users who had VPNs prior to connecting to Tor were not compromised in the same way.
True, but we are talking about sending your true real-life location here. I would strongly advise against mixing real-life activity such as your real-life location with anonymous activity such as what you would typically send through a VPN or Tor. If you use the same VPN for sending your real-life location, and for your anonymous activity, you are revealing to the other end of the VPN exactly where the person doing that anonymous activity is located, ruining all anonymity a VPN alone would give. Same if the location queries are sent out through the same Tor exit as the anonymous traffic, which of course can be prevented, but still.
I think there are very good and strong reason to only send queries regarding your real-life location out through the direct internet connection, as your direct internet connection already is approximately tied to your real-life location (if it is a residential connection, or through cellular triangulation). And then only use VPN and Tor for the activity you actually want to keep private, and isolated from real-life location.
angela I like this but don't know if I agree with it.
Well, please just agree with it. Otherwise you could just as well not use Tor or a VPN to begin with. You mustn't reveal to the other end who you are, that ruins all anonymity such solutions give. And if you are telling the other end which Wifi hotspots are closest to you, you are revealing to the other end exactly where you are. Tor and VPN are supposed to enable you to send out traffic without the other end being able to tell where you are or who you are. If you intentionally tell them that anyway, by telling the other end your exact location, what was the point of even using Tor or VPN?
I mean, it is pretty much equivalent to using VPN+Tor to create an anonymous social media account, and then immediately make a post on that social media account at which real-life residential address you are located. Not very meaningful.
This made me thinking. @GrapheneOS, @soupslurpr, does the network location provider app bypass VPN? Or is there a risk this will start being a serious privacy issue for people who use a VPN, because they don't realize enabling this functionality would now cause the other end of the VPN to learn their exact location?
ryrona if you don't want it to go through VPN, presumably adding the Network Location system app to your vpn's split tunneling would achieve that purpose. I'd rather not have system apps secretly bypassing my VPN connection. We should be able to decide that for ourselves on an individual level depending on our threat models
I am having some issue since this update. Usually once an hour, at different times, while in a user profile on pix 8 pro, the phone does a soft reboot back to owner profile. I can log straight back into the user profile without having to type in the owner profile password...so i assume this is a soft reboot?
Once logged into the user profile a graphene os notification pops up to say "system_ server crashed"
L8437 The network location provider uncovered an upstream Android bug causing system_server crashes. It's why the release didn't move beyond the Alpha channel. We've fixed it and it will be included in today's release which will hopefully be able to go to Beta and then also Stable within a couple days.
angela read my answer again please ;)
ryrona It doesn't bypass the VPN. That only applies to connectivity checks in order for them to work, the standard Android NTP functionality we don't use in order for it to work reliably and fix time issues impacting VPN connections and Wi-Fi calling/texting due to it using an IPSec tunnel which can't be routed through every VPN.
GrapheneOS It doesn't bypass the VPN. That only applies to connectivity checks in order for them to work, the standard Android NTP functionality we don't use in order for it to work reliably and fix time issues impacting VPN connections and Wi-Fi calling/texting due to it using an IPSec tunnel which can't be routed through every VPN.
In that case I suggest to add a clear warning to the screen where network location provider can be enabled that it is not safe to use it together with a VPN, as enabling it will nullify any anonymity the VPN otherwise would give. As already evident from this thread here, people do not realize it will deanonymize them.
Even better, force disable network location provider if a VPN is set. Since @vincente213 answer makes me uncertain people would even listen to a warning. And it is easy to forget one have network location provider enabled, if one add on the VPN at a later point in time.
Does the network location provider use the owner VPN, or the current profile VPN? Is network location provider enabled per profile, or globally for the device?
Could someone kindly explain like I'm five, how using a VPN along with the network location provider will potentially hurt my privacy?
fid02 Could someone kindly explain like I'm five, how using a VPN along with the network location provider will potentially hurt my privacy?
You write a post exposing corruption in your government, posting it anonymously to social media. Your device also gathers a list of nearby Wifi hotspot, to ask for current location. Both of these are sent encrypted to your VPN, and pops out at the other end of the VPN. The adversary at the other end of the VPN now observes an anonymous message exposing corruption, and a list of nearby Wifi hotspots and thus pretty accurate location of that poster.
Whereas if the request for current location didn't go over the VPN, but out directly, the adversary at the other end of the VPN would only see the anonymous message exposing corruption, and wouldn't know where in the country that poster is located.
ryrona does it not use https?
redfoxjumper does it not use https?
Yes. Both for the posting to the social media, and for the network location lookup. But in the VPN model we assume an adversary can obtain information anyway. If HTTPS would prevent this, we wouldn't even need to use VPNs.
Think if both the social media and Apple location server would comply with requests of server logs or active logging from the corrupt government, or even GrapheneOS location proxy would be forced to. This is what VPNs are supposed to protect against, by masking your actual location in the first place.
