I agree with your analysis.
Still I think it is really interesting to see a growing interest among VPN providers to move more and more towards onion-like multihop routing, and that they are recognizing that the nodes mustn't be from the same "family", ie mustn't be from the same operator or company.
But generally speaking, the first hop should be selected as trusted as possible, to minimize the risk of correlation attacks like you describe. Even the Tor project recommends to pin the entry node to one you trust, if you know the fingerprint to a node operated by an organization you trust. The further away from you in the chain the node is, the less trusted it can be. Often you don't consider the destination websites trusted at all.
Either way, you are still doing best in combining VPNs yourself. And one mustn't forget that whatever VPN one use, ones ISP will always be the very first hop.