Claims made by forensics companies, their capabilities, and how GrapheneOS fares

@Hathaway_Noa It appears there's newer documentation showing they caught up to the latest iOS. Do you have access to it?

https://grapheneos.social/@GrapheneOS/112814183717082534

Our thread properly explains the info in the tables including their inability to exploit Pixel 6 or later secure element and only partially bypass it on iPhone 12 or later.

So this guy is saying that Supersonic BF can only do 5000 guesses per day: https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2023/06/what-forensic-vendors-dont-like-to-tell-their-customers-part-2/

Is it because Cellebrite can only partially bypass the secure element on iPhone 12 or later?

Lukas They'll fully bypassing the secure element before the iPhone 12 and Pixel 6. They appear to refer to that level of on-device brute force as supersonic brute force for iPhones. It's still not something they can offload to a server farm without extracting the hardware-bound key from hardware to offload it elsewhere. That means there's an on-device work factor for each key derivation attempt. This is not meant to be possible to bypass with exploits but rather is meant to require extracting the key from the hardware with advanced equipment, with barriers in the way of doing that successfully. These tools inherently can't bypass that based on the limitation of the approach unless there's a major flaw in how it was implemented. It all makes sense based on the design that's used. iPhone 12 and later are likely still having their secure element exploited but they made another layer of security for the secure element's throttling of attempts and it would be harder to bypass that. Titan M2 is likely significantly more secure in practice and they simply haven't been able to compromise it yet. We don't know if they have another layer of security within the Titan M2 for Weaver, but our expectation is that it's simply a lot harder to get any code execution on the Titan M2 in the first place. iPhones have done some things better and Pixels have done some things better.

We don't have much information about what Pixels currently do in the final TEE phase of key derivation. What they do there is important because that's what provides the work factor which is meant to be impossible to offload to a server farm. The OS uses scrypt which can be offloaded to a server farm, so it's up to the TEE to use hardware-bound key derivation where a TEE exploit can't obtain what's needed to offload it. The TEE does not implement the time-based throttling but rather the secure element does that. Android's secure element is different than the iOS one too. It's a separately manufactured chip with authenticated encryption between it and the main SoC via pairing at the factory. iOS uses a separate processor on the same SoC. iOS approach provides lower latency and higher throughput, but it can't be manufactured substantially differently. The Pixel approach means they can theoretically defend better against physical attacks, but we don't have details on what they're doing to defend against those attacks since it's not at all public and has nearly zero public research about it, unlike firmware security research where there's some information available.

horde

Clicking on that link and then the link for imgr shows nothing. Image can't be found.

GrapheneOS

Did some searching and i found this with the image.
https://discuss.privacyguides.net/t/updated-cellebrite-iphone-support-matrix-leak/19578

New thread based on additional information leaked to us beyond the new iOS table leaked elsewhere:

https://discuss.grapheneos.org/d/14344-cellebrite-premium-july-2024-documentation

Please move discussion to the new thread.