Unsubstantiated claims about Cellebrite contradicted by Cellebrite

Aeon Don't worry it's fine, your previous comment is technically correct.

Aeon That's ok! My understanding of English is not always 100%, and theoretically it's my native language. Meanwhile, my understanding of other languages isn't above 20% even on a good day, so I have plenty of opportunities to make mistakes.

I am not a private investigator and a language specialist. But many among us know what chances are of unlocking a Pixel 6+ in AFU even with 4+ sized PIN. Close to zero. Unless the poor sod chose something easy to guess.

Rarry what is your aim with this?

Rarry Thanks, I don't understand swedish so for now, I look at the pictures.

On a friendly note, and I think everyone here will agree, don't behave like an idiot and do anything stupid that could harm you, don't assume you're above the law, GrapheneOS like other tools are there to help us regain a better control over our digital lives, not to help harmful behavior. I'm not talking about journalists, whistle-blowers and innocent people arrested unjustly.

Rarry

This link contains 16pdf files. Could you please link us to which document and page you are referring to?

Its not easy to discuss foreign language files otherwise if we are supposed to translate and search in all 16 ourselves.

This thread is presenting extracting data from devices after entering the correct lock method as unlocking them which is not accurate and it's going to be removed. No evidence of what was claimed was provided, and it contradicts what has been previously made available to us last month.

Cellebrite's official documentation as of April 2024 states they cannot even exploit GrapheneOS devices in either BFU or AFU mode to obtain anything from them. They're only able to exploit much older releases before the late 2022 security patch levels. They also state that they have no secure element exploit for the Pixel 6 or later, even with the oldest patch levels. The only functionality Cellebrite claims to offer is extracting the whole filesystem with the lock method provided to them. No evidence has been provided of what was claimed in the title and initial post.

de0u The only functionality Cellebrite offers with GrapheneOS is performing a full filesystem extraction after the correct lock method is provided and the device is unlocked with it. The only working exploits they have since after the late 2022 patch levels are privilege escalation after being granted ADB access which is a very minor problem and not an impressive capability. For the stock OS, they say that they can exploit both BFU and AFU but cannot bypass the secure element brute force protection on the Pixel 6 or later even with the oldest Pixel 6 firmware without security patches. If people don't want to depend on them not successfully exploiting the secure element, they can use a random 6+ word diceware passphrase instead of a random 6-8 digit PIN.

GrapheneOS The only functionality Cellebrite offers with GrapheneOS is performing a full filesystem extraction after the correct lock method is provided and the device is unlocked with it.

This is good to know. Thanks for clearly explaining the situation.