Question about preventing network traffic and Google account data

The body of the thread has nothing to do with the question, can you elaborate?

WukZarathustra With Pixel smartphones or Pixel Custom Rom, the photos in Google storage are not counted and therefore have unlimited photo storage.

I am not familiar with the details of such a policy. It seems a little unlikely that Google has a written policy addressing custom OSs on Pixels. Can you provide a link to documentation of this policy?

WukZarathustra
your writing is not understandable.
You are using a translator.
Make your sentences shorter and simpler, so the translator can translate correctly.

WukZarathustra

One last question relates to the unlimited Google storage for photos. Is this the same with Grapheneos as with PixelOS?

It's still a Pixel and it still has the Pixel features marked as being there. It likely works the same way despite being a different OS.

I know it misses the mark and is less privacy friendly, but I still want to use Google.

That's fine, and you're not missing the point of GrapheneOS at all.

Custom Rom

We don't use this terminology, it's just an OS.

Now VPN also has gaps and the app can also fail at short notice. In this case, it would be nice if I could prohibit WLAN or mobile data from an app via the operating system.

This isn't correct. Always-on VPN and blocking connections not through VPN are both enabled by default on GrapheneOS for any modern VPN app. There aren't leaks if the VPN goes down or the VPN app crashes unless the VPN app is implemented incorrectly.

The toggles you're talking about for disabling access to Wi-Fi and mobile data on LineageOS are very leaky and don't really work as privacy or security features. They're only an approximation of blocking access, since only direct access is blocked, not access through many APIs requiring the INTERNET permission.

gk7ncklxlts99w1 Daniel Micah answered this here: https://www.kuketz-blog.de/grapheneos-der-goldstandard-unter-den-android-roms-custom-roms-teil7/

Quote:

Connectivity checks aren’t a VPN leak but rather are part of the low-level functionality for establishing a connection to the internet. They’re empty HTTP/HTTPS GET requests with a standard frozen user agent to a standard URL. They don’t send any data. VPNs require that the OS establishes an internet connection and resolves their hostname via DNS in order to connect. Connectivity checks allow the OS to determine which networks have internet access to choose a working one and the main reason they exist is to detect and handle captive portals. On a Wi-Fi or other network with a captive portal, the connectivity checks will detect it, create a notification about it and the user can use the WebView-based interface opened from the notification to handle the captive portal since it has a special case bypassing the VPN. This allows you to deal with captive portals while leaving your always-on VPN enabled instead of temporarily disabling it and connecting to a non-HTTPS website in a browser to trigger the captive portal UI. GrapheneOS provides 3 choices for connectivity checks:

the default of using GrapheneOS servers with at most 4 day logging

standard connectivity checks to blend in with other Android devices while using a VPN and disabling them.

We recommend using the default when not using a VPN and using the standard mode when using a VPN if you want to blend in with other Android users who use VPNs. Disabling it is provided as an option for people who want it, but there isn’t really a good reason to do it.