GrapheneOS GrapheneOS Note that this isn't exactly what was said/implied by the posters in this thread. They were talking about a case where someone steals the phone, modifies the system partition because that's trivial with an unlocked bootloader, and returns the phone to the user, who then gets their credentials and data stolen. A locked bootloader is not a guarantee that the device you hold is your device nor that it wasn't tampered with. n3t_admin An attacker can trivially buy another device of an identical model, set it up with the same style and wallpaper and physical case as the original stolen phone, set the new phone to steal the credentials, and boot the original stolen phone in Safe Mode which enables Airplane Mode automatically. All they have to do is wait for the user to input their credentials, and they can try the same on the stolen phone and unlock it, and theft deterrence apps can't do anything because the phone is in Airplane Mode and they can be disabled from Safe Mode anyway. This kind of attack would be extremely easy for a state to execute.
GrapheneOS I mentioned in this thread that the encryption must work differently when the bootloader is unlocked. I'm interested in hearing how exactly it's different from your FAQ entry about the encryption implementation. Several months ago you told me the verified boot key of the booted OS is involved in the encryption, so with an unlocked bootloader that's out of the question, but your reply suggests there's more changes and out of curiosity I would like to learn that. Maybe the OP would find it educational too. Thank you