undertree Vanadium already supports all of the supplementary EasyList language specific filter lists. You can use them already. The lists for languages you have enabled in Vanadium are used.
1qkv9ddu3so2irvz RandByte It's not based on the language configured for the OS. It's based on the list of languages set for the browser, not the operating system. You can add secondary languages where English is still the preferred language but with additional ones. It's a language preference list. We reused the standard configuration for this to determine which language-specific filters are active. It is configuration via the standard approach. The reason we reused the standard language configuration is to avoid unnecessarily adding more configuration and fingerprinting differences between users via enabled filters. The main reason we don't unconditionally enable all of the lists is because they're not nearly as widely teste as the main lists and have a lot more issues in practice. There would be far more issues with broken sites with all of the lists enabled. By only using the ones for enabled languages, we're greatly reducing compatibility issues. It would be possible to add separate configuration for it but it's not the initial way we approached it.
grabdgr Network-based blocking means blocking the network requests as opposed to only hiding the content. Scripting is a way to extend that to cover more obscure cases.
Johnnyloans
Vanadium and most chromium based browsers mainly rely on network blocking like your adguard on the home network.
DNS-based blocking can't do nearly as much as in the browser since it lacks the same granularity and needs to permit any domain used for useful functionality to avoid breaking it. Blocking within the browser can and does heavily use finer-grained approaches to block more. It still can't block anything used for useful functionality.
This kind of content filtering does not protect against privacy invasive behavior integrated into core functionality of websites/services. It only opportunistically blocks things which aren't going to break anything and can only block what's being done on the client side. It does not provide you with any strong protection against privacy invasive behavior or tracking regardless of how it's implemented.
uBO on firefox can help with scripts, CNAME cloaking, it's more agile reacting to what websites desire to do, and it blocks more ads/trackers.
Firefox has atrocious security and using extensions further reducing security.
Chromium, you're more safe from primarily state actors. If youre worried about that
Firefox's lack of decent security impacts far more than attacks by state actors. It's easy to develop exploits for it and exploits are widely used in the wild including in non-targeted attacks. These claims that security only matters against targeted attacks by state actors are completely bogus. They're common talking points used to justify insecure devices wide open to attacks by unsophisticated attackers. Firefox's lack of security particularly on Android is an issue for far more than targeted attacks and it doesn't take a state actor to exploit it. We're at the point where people are successfully making working exploits using LLMs.