DeletedUser182 Many of the vulnerability examples are memory corruption, like use-after-free, so MTE and other relevant memory exploit mitigations would have helped. OEMs need to move towards defaulting MTE to increase the difficulty of such dangerous attacks.
This article is another example why GrapheneOS cares about memory corruption so much. MTE is the largest security enhancement we have.
Small edit for clarification: Despite all these technical details it is still a trivial way to get infected. Cellebrite unlocks the device, and with that unlocked access the user installs spyware on the device. By the sounds of things the malware needed input from a malicious user or access by a cooperator to be installed. Using numerous new ITW exploits is still extremely dangerous though.
They patched these vulnerabilities which is great, but that won't change that a party having those tools will be able to have total control on vulnerable devices that Cellebrite has exploits to unlock. If they have your credentials, what data that was on there is no longer private to you, zero-day malware or otherwise. OEMs need to focus on not just patching the exploits the spyware tools use, but the exploits the tools that allow them the access to install malware in the first place.
MTE protects against both of these and evidently that technology has inhibited Cellebrite from succeeding.