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  • Safe to use custom launchers on GrapheneOS ?

I'm thinking of using something like Minimalist Phone: Is it safe?

I'm asking this because for the launchers to work, you have to give them overlayering priviliges or something like that, and I'd assume they'd be able to read everything underneath them?

Thanks

Ed: Similarly, is there any easy way to change the "icon theme" of GrapheneOS (for example, to be all Black/White instead of color, or to make them square instead of round, etc), or to eliminate icons altogether without the need for something like Minimalist Phone ?

    As that launcher is closed source, you will always need to place some blind trust in just how secure and respecting of your privacy it is.

    There are several open source launchers that are similarly minimalist however, such as Lunar Launcher, KISS Launcher, Unlauncher, and Olauncher; just to name a few. All of these are free and open source, providing greater transparency.

      mythodical That OLauncher looks sick. I'll 100% try it.

      MetropleX I mean, can the launcher (being an overlayer) read everything, from any app, that is launched within it, or what? In other words, how much can the launcher snoop ?

        Regev the launcher has no special permissions, they are restricted by the same permission model as any other app, in most cases revoking network toggle should be enough as it is an extreme edge case for app developers to take into account. Most of their users will be using the stock android model that doesn't expose this feature like GrapheneOS. The only way they could exfiltrate any usage data would depend on any other SDKs they include in the app and if you had any other app using the same SDK in the user and both apps explicitly granting IPC to each other, such as Firebase Analytics to name one. There are plenty others and developers often include more than one.

        As with any app you download, you must judge your threat model accordingly, only install apps you trust, judge yourself if you really need the app etc.

        When it comes to security, GrapheneOS has you covered, as far as Privacy is concerned, GrapheneOS at first install is the perfect environment, everything you start to add after that while secure, only adds anti-privacy elements which are only as private as the information you provide to them. That includes your usage of them. You should use the tools GrapheneOS provide such as network to mitigate this as much as you can where it is a concern.

        The weakest link to the privacy of your device is YOU.

          The launcher I found that adds everything that's missing to the AOSP launcher is Lawn Chair 2.1.

          NOTE
          This app hasn't been in active development for a a while, but it's fully functional on AOSP 13. While you may find Lawn Chair 12.1 Alpha, this is from a new team of developers picking up the ball where Lawn Chair 2.x left off. While 12.1 Alpha is getting better, I still prefer the completeness of 2.1.

            a year later

            dcd-graphenediscuss am I stupid or is there not a way to have the dock search bar search the internet instead of opening the app drawer?

            MetropleX
            Your last paragraph, and your last sentence should be made into a sticky.

            Many folks badly need to be protected from themselves.

            • [deleted]

            Regev can the launcher (being an overlayer) read everything, from any app, that is launched within it

            No. Learn more about the Display over other apps permission here

            • [deleted]

            MetropleX The only way they could exfiltrate any usage data would depend on any other SDKs they include in the app and if you had any other app using the same SDK in the user and both apps explicitly granting IPC to each other, such as Firebase Analytics to name one.

            Apps can directly interact with each other mutually without the need of any SDK. Also note that an App could still communicate with any App in other user using Network, without needing to use any native Interprocess communication mechanism.