How is GrapheneOS more secure than CalyxOS?

233328

cleb_____ Do you want a comparison between GrapheneOS and CalyxOS, or between sandboxed Google Play and microG? These are not the same thing. This page highlights (some) major differences in security between GrapheneOS and CalyxOS. There's a section dedicated to microG and sandboxed Google Play.

cleb_____ With Graphene's sandboxed Google Servies, you have to sign-in with an account.

Only if you want to download apps from the Play Store or use features that are tied to a Google account. Geolocation, notifications and other services work just fine without.

VAULT

233328 Thx for sharing that link... a good read!

[deleted]

yusufnakh
At a quick glance Neostore is an F-Droid client. OP was talking about the pay store specifically.

flighty_sloth

[deleted] They were just letting OP know that there are alternatives and that on GrapheneOS they don't HAVE to use google at all.

yusufnakh

[deleted] I don't understand your confusion.
Furthermore any application not on the fdroid repository (and others found on neostore) do not meet FOSS conditions and as such would not be listed. That is why I mentioned the Aurora Store for all the other applications.
Good day,
Yusuf

[deleted]

How is GrapheneOS more secure than CalyxOS?

https://eylenburg.github.io/android_comparison.htm
Table comparing GrapheneOS and CalyxOS and many other OSs in terms of privacy, security, degoogling etc.

Murcielago

[deleted]

Great overview - I didn't know that yet. Many thanks!

[deleted]

cleb_____

With Graphene's sandboxed Google Servies, you have to sign-in with an account. Wouldn't that make it less secure?

Obviously not.

And with apps downloaded from the sandboxed PlayStore, would Google Services be able to track and take data from what you do on those apps?

Not at all, unless apps chose to give data to Google.

Or are they all completely separated with no inner-communication?

In normal circumstances, apps can only communicate with each other with mutual consent.

p338k

cleb_____

I've heard that GrapheneOS is more secure than CalyxOS's microG, but just from how (I think) they work it doesn't seem that way to me so I'd like some clarification.

One thing to keep in mind is that security is not the same thing as privacy, but that good security is necessary for privacy. Graphene applies several security improvements to AOSP. See https://grapheneos.org/features for examples.

With microG, you can enable Google Play Services features without ever having to login to a Google Account, so it only sends basic device information. With Graphene's sandboxed Google Servies, you have to sign-in with an account.

It is necessary to sign into Google Play to download software from the store but not to make use of the services.

Wouldn't that make it less secure?

This appears to be a question about microG and sandboxes Google Play. I believe microG in Calyx is a privileged application while Google Play in Graphene uses the standard application sandbox. Graphene's solution should be more secure. Also note that Google Play is optional in Graphene.

And with apps downloaded from the sandboxed PlayStore, would Google Services be able to track and take data from what you do on those apps?

Google will know that the applications are downloaded, but using a Google Play doesn't give Google special access to application data.

Or are they all completely separated with no inner-communication?

Applications normally don't communicate with one another except by mutual consent. I believe notifications is a common use case for this, but note that microG also communicates with Google as part of its necessary function.

bookreader

More secure? Or more PRIVATE?

Privacy and security are definitely related, but also have some very distinct differences and don't mean the same thing. You can have very high security while simultaneously having very very little privacy. Gservices fundamentally result in a loss of PRIVACY. GrapheneOS aims to allow YOU to choose to have your privacy reduced by having Gservices installed, but withOUT the loss of security generally associated with having it installed as highly privileged software.

If calyxos installs microG in the usual way, it results in perhaps less of a hit on privacy, but being granted much greater privileges, a greater hit on security. Those greater privileges mean that any vulnerabilities there may be in the software, have greater potential to give an attacker access to your device. Since grapheneos installs gservices as any other unprivileged software, it has a greater hit to privacy and less hit to security.

Personally, I value both privacy and security, so I install neither. G* has no right to any of my data and can drop dead.

[deleted]

bookreader Since grapheneos installs gservices as any other unprivileged software, it has a greater hit to privacy and less hit to security.

How is it greater hit to privacy when its unprivileged? Its actually a greater hit to have MicroG pre-installed as a system privileged app, as MicroG does load dynamic code directly from Google. Though I do think DivestOS devs have found a way to not let MicroG load dynamic code from Google, but DO NOT take my word for It.

Phead

bookreader G* has no right to any of my data and can drop dead

I agree with the first part but would like to remind you of the mobile OS you're apparently using. There's also a big G in there. Maybe it's not all black and white.

bookreader

[deleted] How is it greater hit to privacy when its unprivileged?

We are comparing gservices to microg, therefore as compared to microg, which doesn't share as much private data.

bookreader

Phead There's also a big G in there.

While Graphene has a G in it too, that's not relevant to this discussion, especially since the changes implemented by Graphene are fairly easy to isolate and audit.

Phead

bookreader
No, I was talking about AOSP but you're right, it's off topic.