Carrousel7956
I have an addendum.
Add the veracrypt style deniable hidden profiles.
Place where it always has been falling apart is at the SSD level. Because forensics can detect data and it isn't actually wiped. This is why Veracrypt needs to be on HDDs for hidden partitions.
Key change: add a 6th USB exploit protection even more extreme than "off". "Permanently off" you can only charge in the mode like regular USB off. No data can be transferred even when the your full unlock is handed over because it's a one time flip.
You can disable "permanent off" mode by factory resetting.
This prevents an attacker from doing the forensic examination because the SSD isn't observable.
Problems I see:
USB exploit protection is the main gate for your safety. How reliable is it?
This is less secure because you are missing the defense in depth strategy employed from the combination of secure minimal attack surface lock screen+encrypted lock screen+USB exploit protection.
Large attack surface from being given an actual access to a profile. But this would be true no matter if hidden profiles could be implemented correctly when the trim/wear leveling problem didn't exist.
Giving an attacker access to a decoy profile would make it far easier for them to exploit the device.
Would it actually be deniable if the only reason to use this and likely the only people using this would be people with hidden partitions? (because it compromises USB functionality permanently.)