Xtreix
There seems to be some wacky anti-GrapheneOS misinformation campaign in Sweden right now.
On the Swedish forum Flashback, there's a user that claims the exact same thing that the OP in this thread is claiming, except a few days sooner.
https://www.flashback.org/sp92274597
ChatGPT translation of the above thread:
The Police's Secret Data Reading (HDA) – How It Really Works (Personal Theory)
After reading a lot of reports, extensive Googling, and browsing internet forums filled with IT experts, articles, etc., and having been detained myself and reading the evidence against me, I believe I have grasped how HDA works in practice.
It’s not about the police accessing your mobile phone to film the screen or activating the camera/microphone. Such actions require advanced tools like Pegasus, which are only used in extreme cases – like at the "Fox" level due to the costs involved.
What actually happens is that Swedish operators (Telenor, Telia, etc.) can, with new technology, read data traffic – meaning texts, messages, searches, IP addresses, etc. This data is stored and provided to the police when needed. This is what is called HDA.
So: all text sent in/out via, for example, Signal, WhatsApp, Google searches, apps, etc. – that is what the police receive. Pure text data. And of course, voice calls where operators can somehow record audio from all calls in and out, even from Signal, etc.
Questions I have:
Is GrapheneOS safe against this when combined with a maximum VPN (Mullvad)?
Should one use mobile broadband with a data card and share the network? Does it help?
Should one buy anonymous Russian SIM cards? Ghost SIM cards? I assume this wouldn’t help since they would still connect to Swedish towers.
There must be a solution; come up with your theories, guys.
I’m not 100% sure, but based on my experience from when I was detained and what I’ve read regarding the evidence against me, this feels like the most likely and logical way.
I found this thread in the first place because the above guy links to this very thread in another post in the above thread:
https://www.flashback.org/sp92314430
There is another user in the above Swedish thread making claims that the GrapheneOS developers are lying about the protection that the OS is bringing:
https://www.flashback.org/sp92286766
ChatGPT translation:
You have already received "sources," but you do not accept them.
Once again, since STK is a separate module on the SIM that runs before the OS is active, your GrapheneOS cannot do anything.
STK is just old Java, and you have also received a full lecture on how to run code there (from people who are significantly more competent than you). The operators have full access to USSD and the SIM. They also have access to the baseband modem and the processor that belongs to the baseband. This function cannot be controlled or disabled by any OS.
The GrapheneOS developers are so arrogant that they only respond that they have disabled the STR-Toolkit service at the user level, which they believe stops attacks at the user level (duh!). But they have completely forgotten that the operators themselves control the baseband module, which is below the kernel level of what GrapheneOS can handle.
Pretty suspicious if you ask me.