n3t_admin Linux https://www.linuxjournal.com/content/when-flatpaks-sandbox-cracks-real-life-security-issues-beyond-ideal
Yes, I have.
"Yet, many Flatpak packages declare broad permissions like filesystem=home, filesystem=host, or device=all. That effectively grants full read-write access to the user's home directory or even system devices, defeating the purpose of the sandbox in practice. Users often assume that 'sandboxed' means locked-down, but blanket permissions expose them to risk."
- Flathub will explivitly warns users about such a permission and marks the app as unsafe for using it.
- Users can just remove these permission with Flatseal before running the app
- In the long term this will get replaced with Portals and one day, permissions like
filesystem=home, filesystem=host
Will get viewed as unacceptable for most application and apps using these will just get ignored or even moved out of Flathub. Put I think its more important to push apps to transition from X11 to Wayland because unlike with the filesystem=home the user can't just make a few GUI clicks or run a command to port every application to Wayland.
"
Real-World Breakouts from the Sandbox
CVE‑2024‑32462: RequestBackground Portal Abuse
Security researcher Gergo Koteles uncovered a high-severity vulnerability where malicious Flatpak apps could craft a .desktop file via the org.freedesktop.portal.Background.RequestBackground interface. That tricked Flatpak’s --command= parsing into injecting bwrap arguments (e.g. --bind). This allowed arbitrary host commands to execute outside the sandbox boundary. Versions before 1.10.9, 1.12.9, 1.14.6, and 1.15.8 were affected. Patched in the listed versions and mitigated in xdg-desktop-portal 1.18.4 and newer.
CVE‑2024‑42472: Persistent Data Symlink Exploit
A Flatpak flag, --persist (or persistent= in manifest), allows apps writable storage within their data directory. But if a malicious install replaces that directory with a symlink pointing to sensitive host folders (e.g. ~/.ssh), the sandbox mount entry follows it into the real filesystem, giving the app unintended access to files outside its name-spaced area. All versions up to 1.14.8 and 1.15.x ≤ 1.15.9 are vulnerable; patched in 1.14.10 and 1.15.10+.
"
These are bugs and there where patched.
NetRunner88 At some point the dev behind secureblue has a good approach to handle flatpack permissions garbage
What would/does this approach look like?