Setting up a secondary passcode that opens a dummy profile

propsecprv2

That depends on what you want.

There isn't any really good way to image a GOS phone and restore that image (although it would be really nice).

How long are you going to be overseas? Is it basic tourism or something legally dubious? Are you likely to get on (or already be on) watch lists? What functionality do you want while traveling? What level of technical ability do you have? What level of resources are you willing to invest?

I mean you could make a Cryptomator archive containing a KeePass vault, Obtanium export for all the apps you want, Signal backup, etc. Then host it on Proton Drive and email the drive link to a throw away email. Once GOS is installed, access the throw away email to get the link, download the encrypted archive, reinstall your apps/restore backups, etc. Do the reverse before you leave.

That will be more than sufficient for most people.

userA No it would not. Your assumption is that when someone would ask for your phone and unlock code for it, is they they'd be 'fooled' with fake profile. But it is clearly visible that you have more than one profile and you can't exclude that once they started doing such checks they will not be thorough and knowledgeable.

userA This is merely a question of how you would design the profile.

The sole fact you have separate profiles would raise an eyebrow and people would start asking questions. There's a separate thread about this very same case, my response was bring a dumb travel phone without any of your data just to be able to be in touch with people. Much better approach imho.

I think a dummy profile would be useful as a quick way to try to evade a problem. It wouldn't work for a forensic computer specialist, but there aren't tons of those on-site.

JollyRancher If a USA entry agent rebooted a GOS phone and saw the yellow error message, how may they react? Best guess, of course.

axino rebooted a GOS phone

They'd not, not on purpose at least. When they take your phone for a screening they (should) follow a list of things they're supposed to check and/or do. And reboot would not be one of them.

If by accident. They'd not know what is happening, but it would definitely raise suspicion and it would cause further issues for you.

0xsigsev Because some believe it is more secure than storing it elsewhere.

keep it secure and " airgap" myself from it, now that's secure, secure and in my pocket, that's dumb.
The official at the border states "open your phone", you refuse, play out the unravelling scenario in your head... Gaining entry to the country is not one of the available options,

axino
Are you a US citizen? If the answer is 'no' then you will either provide full access to your phone (i.e input the password for them) or you won't be allowed in the US.

If you are a US citizen then they can't deny you entry but they can seize your phone.

Having a secure phone and refusing to provide access isn't a crime in the US but, again, they can deny you entry to the US and blacklist you.

Generally, if your devices are subject to search in the first place it is because you are already on a list. If you aren't a US citizen and are outside the US then the NSA has an absolute, unfettered, unlimited right under US law to spy on you, intercept your communications, track you, build a detailed profile on you, and just generally put your entire life under a microscope.

If you have, or have applied for, a visa to enter the US then you will be prioritized.

Take the Rasha Alawieh deportation. She traveled to a location that US Intel cares about and her phone was at the location of a terrorists funeral. Those facts alone were likely enough to get her flagged by the automated algorithms for greater scrutiny. So immigration tags her for a more in depth search upon return to the US and find the pictures used to publicly justify booting her.

area51 Why would anyone with sensitive data keep it on their phone and then carry it about, I would distance myself from it, fast as possible.

Because a Pixel 9 running GOS is the single most secure compute device in the world that can be acquired globally with relative ease by the average person.

If you want to ensure that data remains secure, GOS with relatively simple opsec is the best option.

You just shouldn't try and cross international borders with it, or do anything else that amounts to deliberately taunting the US national security establishment while under their physical control and wanting something from them (entry to the US).

JollyRancher If you want to ensure that data remains secure, GOS with relatively simple opsec is the best option.

I agree GrapheneOS is undoubtedly secure, no question,
Simple opsec... Don't have that data on your person.
If you end up being challenged for whatever reason and its in your pocket, it limits what you can say or do

Saw this article today.
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2025/mar/26/phone-search-privacy-us-border-immigration

Seems like there be some value to coming up with a feature that allows you to create a "check point profile" for border crossing.

The main goal is to provide enough "real" data that you dont draw extra attention from border agents when they begin inspecting your device. However, if they do confiscate it and plug it into a a cellibrite the forensic tools will not find anything because the profile does not contain any sensitive data.

Think of this as kind of a cameflouge tool with the intent of giving the border agent enough to look at that you dont raise enough flags to warrant a closer look but none of the data they see would be anything compromising.

This would most likely take some time to create and require updates but it could be useful for helping you to get through check points without having your device confiscated.

propsecprv2 The main goal is to provide enough "real" data that you dont draw extra attention from border agents when they begin inspecting your device. However, if they do confiscate it and plug it into [a] cellibrite the forensic tools will not find anything because the profile does not contain any sensitive data.

That could work if forensic tools agreed to obediently inspect just one profile while ignoring the rest of the device. But there is no such agreement. Similar suggestions have been made multiple times, and multiple times the GrapheneOS developers have said it's not possible at present to hide how many user profiles are on a device, and that, without a factory reset, evidence that a secondary profile once existed remains even after the secondary profile has been deleted.

de0u
Thanks for the response. I think I did not do a good job of explaining what I am thinking. I would like to start with a clean new GOS install and create some real data but data that is not senestivie. Something that would be based on actual use (think txts with my family about pick up times and some web searches for a new car). Then I would essentially take a back up or a snap shot of the device. Still no sensitive data at this point. Then go through US customs. The goal of this effort would be to have enough data on the phone to not raise any alerts on the part of CPB. If they cpb agent wishes to futher scrutinize the device they could because in effect it would still not store any sensitive data. I agree with the general consensus that at no point should you carry too much sensitive data on your device although I understand this may not be possible. That said, I am thinking of it in terms of a if/then set of scenarios. If CPB agent is not alerted by data on phone than leave check point without having sensitive data comprimised. IF CPB agent is alerted by content on phone than further forensic analysis still reveals nothing.
The loaded profile would be an attempt to pass as a normal cell phone user with nothing to hide. I write this with the full understanding that this is a very difficult line to walk.

Based on some of the tools and steps discussed above it may be possible though.