n2gwtl I have done that shift and didn't find it that hard. You mainly have to reenter your path and reidentify.

Themble Is Obtainium a decent alternative?

Questionable. I think the two sides of the coin has been discussed above. With Obtainium you don't put any trust in F-Droid, but on the other hand, you put all that trust in yourself instead.

Think of using F-Droid as installing apps in Linux from the official repositories, and Obtainium as downloading exe-files from the web in Windows. Neither is necessarily better or worse for the security for someone that knows what they are doing. F-Droid seems clearly better if you don't know what you are doing, so you don't end up installing malware or vulnerable versions.

Is it imperative in order to have proper security, to use AppVerifier along with it?

If an app verifies with AppVerifier, you put the trust in AppVerifier instead of yourself or F-Droid. So generally, that would be a very good choice over using Obtainium without AppVerifier.

n2gwtl

n2gwtl A lot of privacy focused apps have directed us to download from FDroid - Molly, Thunderbird, Proton.It is very difficult to make a right decision from the beginning because of the lack of clarity.

I agree. This is quite problematic as it gives the user the idea that F-Droid is secure and trustworthy. Especially when you got big apps like those on there. Actually pretty much most of the only decent VPN providers are on there as well. Which as you said is only a problem cause of the lack of clarity and information.

n2gwtl Moving away from FDroid now feels like the transition from an IPhone to GrapheneOS. Too many apps configured to work with a homelab that now all have to be redone.

Depends on what apps you use. Most of my apps had backups or were even configured to use data outside of themselves entirely so my transition only really took a few hours at most.

ParanoidAndroid

ParanoidAndroid F-Droid's security is a point but when F-Droid builds the app it is more or less guaranteed, that the app was build from the source code. This is not the case when Obtainium is the installation-source because the signature that can be verified has nothing to do with the Code.

The bigger question here is do you trust them to take care of everything for you or not? If you trust them enough then use them.

ParanoidAndroid If my assumption is correct I don't get why I should trust many developers when using Obtainium instead of only trusting F-Droid. Isn't the Security compromised with each app that is installed and updated via Obtainium?

As I said you are still trusting the developers to an extent especially since as mentioned F-Droid's security checks are rather... Bad and ineffective currently.

In terms of obtainium you are partially correct especially if you do not manually verify them yourself. The concept of the way obtainium is often suggested over F-Droid is that you don't have a extremely insecure source managing all of your apps. Obtainium isn't necessarily insecure or secure in the sources that it connects to (depends on the source of course) but it does have issues that have been discussed which while don't make it a necessarily insecure option they do make it a problematic option as how it handles things in my honest opinion is not a good nor reliable way to obtain apps unless as a last resort which is why I mainly use RSS and just do everything manually including the verification processes.

There's evidently reasons why GrapheneOS doesn't actually recommend or suggest Obtainium.

Because just like F-Droid it is problematic except in some different ways. The only problematic thing they really share is that they both break the Android trust model due to them both being able to basically add any third party source they want while technically being a app store.

Me personally I avoid Obtainium as much as possible except for places where RSS feeds cannot cover. Which so far is only one application so I would say that is going pretty well. And even then I plan to resolve that to where I can get rid of obtainium entirely.

Point being. I trust myself enough to where I can manage everything myself. Because if a developer all of a sudden turns malicious and ships a malicious update. Or the app is spyware. Well I'm rather confident in my ability to be able to notice and detect that and then when I do it's time to pull the app from my Device and feeds. And for the installation process after being notified of an update I use Vanadium to download it (wouldn't trust any browser with lesser security for such a task) and then do check and verify it if possible and then after installation keep a really close eye for any suspicious activity for the initial week of installation. Of course. I do plan to shift from RSS to Accrescent as it matures but until then...

But I know everyone is different and you may not be as confident in doing so. Which is perfectly fine and understandable! After all that's a pretty big position to take for most and some people may just simply not be able to do it for one reason or another.

That's precisely the point I'm trying to make about F-Droid is do you feel like you yourself trust it enough to let it manage your apps despite it's security issues? You can listen to people go back and fourth about pros and cons but not every solution is for everyone. There are legitimate reasons to use F-Droid as are there legitimate reasons to use any app source.

Think for yourself. Do you trust yourself to manage your apps more or F-Droid? Because that's basically what you have to do with Obtainium or RSS is manage security yourself.
Come to your own conclusion on what you yourself want to use. What you think is better for you. Cause honestly this Obtainium versus F-Droid stuff is just going to keep going on and on cause both sides have issues. And it's precisely these reasons why I am not giving you a suggestion myself.

Hope this extra info and explanation helps you make a decision!

    DeletedUser95
    Thank you so much for this! I think it is one of the best and summarized explanation for this discussion, I think it is important to understand why you should trust this or that or why you should not. I think in many discussions this comes too short.

    DeletedUser95 for the installation process after being notified of an update I use Vanadium to download it (wouldn't trust any browser with lesser security for such a task) and then do check and verify it if possible

    Would you please give more detail on how you are doing apk verification after download? I assume you are using Appverifier on the device for as many as possible, correct? Are you also doing a parallel download into a desktop environment and using apksigner in the terminal and then comparing shasums back to Appverifier? Do you have another method on-device? Thanks

    a month later

    Can we get clarity on FDroid? It seems that security is fine if apps host their own repository. App developers build and sign the apps in their own repository and FDroid does it if it is in the main FDroid repo. What can we say about Izzy's security?

    Reference: https://simplex.chat/fdroid/

      n2gwtl The security of F-Droid repos depends on the security of your F-Droid client app. The official F-Droid client apps come from F-Droid, third-party forks of them still contain code from F-Droid due to forking, and other third-party client apps that aren't forks of the official apps still carry the risk of trusting an unknown third-party client app that god-knows-who created.

      n2gwtl The official F-Droid repository and Izzy's repository are highly untrustworthy sources of apps which should be avoided. F-Droid itself and the repository system have poor security. The official F-Droid repository has massive usability and security issues with how they do builds and signing. The issue brought up in this thread is pretty close to irrelevant with very little impact and has little to do with the real, severe problems with them.

      After this thread was posted, I thought back to why I've started to use F-Droid in the first place. F-Droid, and open source software in general, was never meant for security. The only security benefit of open source software per se is that the users are allowed to not depend on the software author's trustworthiness. Note that this is different from not depending on their trustworthiness, it's being allowed to not depend. One of the beneficial goals of F-Droid was also to gather open source apps that may not be entirely freedom-respecting, and either strip them of the freedom-disrespecting parts and/or mark them appropriately. This was supposed to be for the benefit of freedom, not for security. Furthermore, the idea that F-Droid should responsibly build and distribute the apps they offer, including enabling reproducible builds, is not supposed to be a security benefit of F-Droid, it's a basic responsibility that they willingly don't fulfill.

      I like the idea that there's a catalog of freedom and privacy-respecting open source apps and that someone curates based on their quality and security, but while F-Droid does have some high-quality apps, they're neither curated as aforementioned, nor built and distributed responsibly.

      There's also the argument that the fact that F-Droid signs the apps using their own keys adds an additional point of failure — I understand the argument but personally I might not have a problem trusting an additional party, if they were acting responsibly. F-Droid clearly doesn't. And the apps they sign themselves hijack the package name, which prevents the ability to have both the original version and the F-Droid version side-by-side, and prevents easily migrating data to leave the F-Droid versions of apps.

      So can people please stop saying that they want F-Droid for better security?

        @Artr Your assumptions are completely wrong and there's no need to post assumptions here in the first place. If it takes them half a year to notice WireGuard including a self-update system against their policies, what makes you think they're even looking at the release notes let alone at the actual code? It's simply not what they do. They are not actually reviewing the code in the way you think but rather are doing things based on half-baked scanning and user reports.

        F-Droid is a highly untrustworthy group of people consistently involved in cover ups of vulnerabilities and attacks on security researchers including harassment. We advise against using it for even a single app. Get the apps directly from the developers instead and you're avoiding trusting highly untrustworthy people as a middleman who are consistently doing the opposite of protecting you. They aren't going to protect you from a compromise where hidden malicious code is included in practice unless the people doing it completely lack any attempt at stealth which would include them doing similar scans themselves to make sure it's not going to get flagged.

          n2gwtl We've been clear the official F-Droid repository is not a trustworthy source of apps and that F-Droid is not a secure or recommended way to obtain apps in general. Apps which are serious about security should provide a better way of obtaining and updating their app such as including a self-update system in the app.

            GrapheneOS If this was a reply to my post, I withdraw my assumption. It was based on the timing of the first published article and its eventual discussion in Hacker News. After this, F-Droid published the basic version of the client with fewer privileges as a fix to the lower-hanging fruits of the complaints about their security practices. It does not necessarily mean the first article caused the changes. I only (as you corrected) wrongly assumed the chain of events. Despite this, a distribution system that can be compromised easily is not an option.
            As for the goals, they have nothing to do with the team or the project; the goals, objectively, are deemed necessary, and (unfortunately) there are no alternatives that can deliver those objectives right now. The most unfortunate, however, is that this topic of discussion has been around for over 3 years and is directed at the people rather than solutions.
            I can see how some of their community members' replies target a person and offend them in their blog posts. I hope the discussion here can be more about how an ideal replacement would operate if it were to stick to the above mentioned goals.
            A direct APK distribution system is not a replacement.
            A distribution system which controls developer keys is not a replacement.
            A distribution system that can selectively update apps and libraries of a particular device without user knowledge is not a replacement.
            Instead of enumerating the badness of a particular project or the team members, the discussion could be about the goals of an alternative project, which will probably be more helpful in redirecting resources towards better projects.

              Artn The basic client was released much earlier and didn't address security issues beyond updating the target API level.

              A distribution system which controls developer keys is not a replacement.

              It's possible to require multiple signatures, which is an approach we plan on offering as an optional feature for GrapheneOS updates eventually.

              GrapheneOS I think what's needed is a consortium of the big players in privacy and security - GrapheneOS, signal, simplex, proton, tuta, Mozilla, etc - to come to agreements on what is important for the industry and to release a white paper and certification on best practices. And for the consortium to get behind projects critical for supply chain security and privacy (such as accrescent app store) to finally complete the whole pipeline for the community. It would also help to balance against the Play Integrity API and other issues.

                n2gwtl Tuta posts a lot of nonsense in their social media, blog, etc. Mozilla does not take security seriously at all and laid off a huge portion of their security people. Neither of those are a good fit for working with us.

                Watermelon So can people please stop saying that they want F-Droid for better security?

                Some people like to think of security and privacy and freedom as three distinct categories, and on the surface it may seem to make a lot of sense. But in practice, they are intertwined. Many on this forum has said one cannot have privacy without security, as if the app one use is not secure and can be hacked, one simply does not have any privacy either, no matter how privacy respecting the app was designed to be. I have argued the opposite holds too, that one cannot have security without privacy, as if your privacy is compromised, your personal security is also compromised.

                This really applies to the freedom aspect as well. The probably most politically relevant example right now is in case end-to-end encryption would be outlawed, or client side scanning would be mandated by law. If you don't have freedom, you would lose end-to-end encryption or be forced to have government scan all your private files and messages. Then you no longer have any privacy at all, either, and thus no personal security. But freedom will allow you to modify your system, and re-enable end-to-end encryption and remove client side scanning.

                And telemetry and how Apple and stock Google devices have zero privacy is often discussed, and is a major sales point for GrapheneOS. Yet, Linux also have telemetry by default, but it can be easily disabled, by simply uninstalling the telemetry components. Freedom guarantees that. It does seem freedom is necessary for privacy, and privacy is necessary for personal security. It is all intertwined.

                I use F-Droid, because I cannot afford having that freedom taken away from me in my threat model. I am an activist for the rights of the oppressed minority I belong to, and loss of freedom and thus privacy and thus personal security would mean I get silenced.

                I wished there was an app repository that took all of security, privacy and freedom seriously though.

                  ryrona I wished there was an app repository that took all of security, privacy and freedom seriously though.

                  I've heard that Accrescent is planning to label and add the ability to filter open source apps. So that might be the closest alternative.

                    Watermelon I've heard that Accrescent is planning to label and add the ability to filter open source apps. So that might be the closest alternative.

                    They won't start building the apps themselves though, but will just trust the uploader the same as if it was a proprietary app. So not really.

                      ryrona They won't start building the apps themselves though, but will just trust the uploader

                      I think it's only an issue for this usecase:

                      Watermelon One of the beneficial goals of F-Droid was also to gather open source apps that may not be entirely freedom-respecting, and either strip them of the freedom-disrespecting parts and/or mark them appropriately.

                      For high quality open source apps I believe it shouldn't be needed.