GrapheneOS
Thanks @ryrona for sharing your thoughts on this issue and @GrapheneOS on your considered response above. I briefly saw commentary on these forums from @kfish682 about a root certificate issue, it appears their thread and user account here have since both been deleted.
I would also like to advocate for a "Never delete security issues" policy for GrapheneOS. It's entirely fair to mark a bug as INVALID or DUPLICATE and close the issue if it's considered an upstream issue, already reported, or similar of course; no-one wants a bugtracker clogged with irrelevant open issues.
I have been reflecting on my recent report of a regression in the 20241117+20241118 builds where Bluetooth contacts were shared with devices without user permission. Although upstream AOSP is far from perfect in this regard, those builds introduced GrapheneOS's first attempt to improve upstream's behaviour but it accidentally made the problem worse.
I spent several hours digging through the GOS source to find how the regression occurred, and slowly typing a Github issue on my phone (as I was travelling with a rental car -- connecting my phone to it brought my attention to the issue), so perhaps the wording wasn't perfect and I did struggle with tabbing between all the relevant pages. I think initially it was perceived as purely an upstream problem and I received a rapid series of emails in response noting that it was therefore misinformation and the bug report was marked as invalid, closed and then deleted entirely.
Luckily we managed to work through the issue on these forums as linked above, and as the full nature of the regression was understood it was patched. As things calmed down the developers noted it was "Probably the worst regression we've caused" (which is fine -- mistakes happen to everyone). Ultimately the fix had a good outcome for the project and subsequent builds have been more secure for everyone.
However I worry what happens if a competent security researcher finds a zero-day in GrapheneOS, files an issue, and it gets deleted based on a misinterpretation, perception that they are ill-mannered or similar. Potentially if they get offended, they could sell it on the vulnerability black market, and decline to report any further issues they discover, which would be a bad outcome for all. Better to leave issues open for preservation and attribution to the original reporter(s), and work collectively to clarify the security impact (if any) of the report.