Yes, while this seems like a considerable side channel attack, it's not one that really needs to be worried about for the majority of people. Since this is a vulnerability with FIDO authentication leading to key discovery, the scary title of "YubiKeys Cloneable!" isn't entirely accurate. The rest of the credentials on the key are safe, the whole key cannot be cloned, and triggering the use of the FIDO credential (i.e. logging in to the site with the FIDO cred) is required to actually make use of the side channel vuln.
From the Ars Technica article:
The attacks require about $11,000 worth of equipment and a sophisticated understanding of electrical and cryptographic engineering. The difficulty of the attack means it would likely be carried out only by nation-states or other entities with comparable resources and then only in highly targeted scenarios. The likelihood of such an attack being used widely in the wild is extremely low. Roche said that two-factor-authentication and one-time password functionalities aren't affected: because they don't use the vulnerable part of the library.
If this vuln scares you but you don't want to replace your key (and I would argue anyone except high risk individuals don't bother), simply invalidate all of your FIDO credentials and switch to password login. Lock that password with something on the YubiKey/some other secret. You lose the convenience of quick FIDO logins, but honestly I never liked FIDO-only single-factor login anyway (nor the thought that the website owner now knows I am using a FIDO key), so I never used it and am not affected by this security advisory :)
Do note that if your FIDO credential is not the only factor in use, the hypothetical attacker must possess all of that information prior to executing this attack. If a username, password, PIN, face scan, or etc is required before your FIDO credential is used, the difficulty of the attack goes up.