GoS has lockdown mode?

K8y

de0u If the Pegasus authors are willing to join this forum and answer questions about how to resist their software, then it will be possible to receive unambiguous answers to questions about how to resist their software.

haha ok I get your point. Maybe one will repent and use his skills for good and become a Robin Hood. I think Eric Prince says he has a former Pegasus guy helping design his phone.

As for the 30 min reboot...does rebooting kick out Pegasus type intrusions? I wonder how hard it is for them to get back in if so...

de0u

K8y As for the 30 min reboot...does rebooting kick out Pegasus type intrusions?

Plausibly, but not certainly.

K8y

Johnnyloans If you're a journalist documenting government activities then hire a professional.

thank you for your thorough reply. Can these professionals discover if one's phone was ever infected by a remote pegasus/paragon intrusion? would it leave a "fingerprint" to use as evidence in court?

de0u

K8y Can these professionals discover if one's phone was ever infected by a remote pegasus/paragon intrusion?

Sometimes.

K8y would it leave a "fingerprint" to use as evidence in court?

Sometimes.

Here is some Citizen Lab material on Pegasus: https://citizenlab.ca/tag/pegasus/

K8y

Johnnyloans A locked molly database, no they can't.
This feature is built into the molly app.

So a pin locked Molly app cannot be opened and messages viewed by someone using pegasus snooping around your profile?

But they could with Signal, session and the rest?

K8y

K8y So a pin locked Molly app cannot be opened and messages viewed by someone using pegasus snooping around your profile?

But they could with Signal, session and the rest?

bumping in case experts here can shed more light on Molly vs Pegasus types.

c86

K8y

At risk of adding yet another commenter... If an exploit such as those sold by NSO or Paragon manage to function on a device (substantially more difficult on a GOS device than vanilla android or iOS), they essentially "own" the device.

A pin protected secure messaging app will be accessible to the exploit once the app's pin is entered by the user to decrypt the data and use the app.

K8y

c86 A pin protected secure messaging app will be accessible to the exploit once the app's pin is entered by the user to decrypt the data and use the app.

This is terribly depressing if true. So it knows your pin after you enter it, even though the numbers are blocked out?

DeletedUser733

de0u Turn the device off whenever it's not actively in use and/or set the auto-reboot timer to 30 minutes. In turn this might necessitate getting a second lower-security device to leave on all the time for receiving regular phone calls.

Turning the phone off, may suggest you have bought the wrong device for your supposed threat level.
I have auto reboot set at 10 minutes and don't have problems with calls coming in

de0u

DeletedUser733 Turning the phone off, may suggest you have bought the wrong device for your supposed threat level.

A device is one matter, but installed apps is another matter. A threat model is probably more effective than a threat level.

K8y

DeletedUser733 I have auto reboot set at 10 minutes and don't have problems with calls coming in

This is an interesting strategy to stop Pegasus type attacks. Is the theory it kicks out Pegasus every time it reboots, and therefore it becomes time intensive for the Pegasus operator to find a way back in?...Or is the operator able to just simply "log" back in easily in 2 seconds after your reboot?

DeletedUser733

K8y
I suppose that if a Pegasus operative is "in" then its game over as they may well control the phone and turn auto reboot off, etc.
I use the 10 minute auto reboot because its available and does not conflict or restrict the use of my phone.
I also do not use finger print access, which means every time I unlock my phone be it BFU or AFU states, its always a long pin number 16+ digits...

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