Skimmed a few prior convos re: Vanadium + privacy, and the standard response is that fingerprinting unavoidable. What about general social media tracking though?
Social media trackers don't primarily rely on fingerprinting. They rely on network requests you make to their infrastructure. When a Twitter embed loads in Vanadium, Twitter receives your IP, a timestamp, and behavioral data, not because they fingerprinted you, but because your browser made a request to their server.
I run AGH and my understanding is that DNS blocking handles dedicated tracking domains but cannot operate below the domain level. A content domain like twimg.com serving a legitimate image can simultaneously execute tracking scripts and cookie syncing in the same request. DNS only sees one thing while uBO can differentiate between them.
Social media embeds are arguably the most widespread tracking vector on the modern web — they're on news sites, forums, blogs, everywhere. Vanadium has no mechanism to address this layer. The choice is binary: block the domain entirely (breaks content) or allow everything through.
There are mainstream, popular, existing tools that solve this already (ie uBO) allow the content, strip the tracking payload. This isn't about fingerprinting at all. It's about whether your browser can perform surgical request filtering, which requires extension support Vanadium deliberately omits.
I get that Vanadium makes sense if you are being threatened by a government et al, but for the vast majority of the rest of us, I am curious why a seemingly basic level of privacy protection isn't enabled?