ryrona However, it looks like the Dasharo developers have just introduced their third super serious security vulnerability in the firmware in only two years. And found it before release but decided to release firmware update anyway. I am trying to get in touch with them for clarification, and will attempt to contact NovaCustom soon too. Although NovaCustom already seems rather upset about Dasharo from the previous two incidents.
Okay, this turns out to be far far worse than I thought. Dasharo developers have not only confirmed that there is no effective signature verification when installing firmware updates, they have also said they do not consider it an important issue, "since we [Dasharo] considered gaining root privileges a full compromise".
https://github.com/Dasharo/dasharo-issues/issues/1075
I guess at this point doing a security audit is pointless. They don't offer any effective security against malware at all, and do simply not intend to. At this point, I think they are fairing far worse than proprietary BIOS/UEFI vendors, as proprietary vendors at least tries to get Microsoft certification for their Secure Boot implementation, despite being a very low bar to meet, which requires prevention of attacks by a fully compromised operating system, including an attacker with root privileges.
I have raised the issue with NovaCustom too.
https://novacustom.com/forum/d/960-concerning-the-lack-of-signature-verification-for-capsule-updates
I'll have to await their response. I intend to raise the issue with the QubesOS community too, since they likely cares the most.
But at this point, it looks like forking Dasharo and patching up all security vulnerabilities is the only way, since Dasharo does not care.