cellto Calling privacyguides.org a random site makes me think you're plain ignorant........(I'm not referring to the particular guide but in general)
Why are we throwing stones here?
PrivacyGuides are not security experts. Some of the advice is actually good practice, but it's presented in a way to make the reader think that they are making their computer as secure as possible by following every step, and that's not a good thing. Half of the tweaks don't meaningfully improve security while making the user think that they do, and they don't mention any of the critical (and currently unfixable) security flaws that most desktop computers have. They don't truly understand security. All this page does is make less knowledgeable people feel like they are making their device secure, which is harmful because then the user will be more lax about how they use their computer, believing that it's now secure. You even followed this guide and thought you knew enough to be in a position to call someone else ignorant (despite recognizing that you yourself don't really understand it.)
The recommendation to use generic user and host names in order to "hide information" is kinda laughable, and that's literally the first point in the article. It's not a good start. Telling users that they can "secure the boot chain" by disabling USB boot in bios and adding a bios password is not good advice either. Those settings don't do anything to ensure boot integrity, and anyone with physical access to the machine to boot from unauthorized USB devices could just clear CMOS. You can guard against this by any method of preventing physical access, but when physical access is not possible, those bios settings serve no purpose, so why are they being recommended?
As far as USB goes: disabling AutoPlay of USB devices doesn't really do much to prevent malware hiding in USB devices. There is no protection against USB "flash drives" that actually present themselves to the OS as a mouse and keyboard, that can be programmed to send any key strokes or commands. Keyboards and mice are treated as trusted devices and don't require any confirmation to install their drivers and start sending inputs. A malicious USB device could also have onboard storage like any regular USB flash drive, but also present itself as a mouse and keyboard in addition to the USB storage. Then it can just send inputs to run a malicious script or executable stored on the drive, even if Autorun doesn't exist anymore for USB drives and AutoPlay was disabled.
You might think, oh, I'll just unplug it if I see something pop up on screen or the mouse starts moving, but by the time you might have seen an unknown window blink on your screen, it's already over. It only takes milliseconds for a usb device to send a Win+R input and send keystrokes to input and run malicious commands. You might think that UAC would prevent the malicious commands(s) from having the admin rights they might need to run malicious code and access sensitive data, but that's not necessarily true because it could be exploiting an unknown privilege escalation vulnerability, or some malicious commands might not even require admin rights to be harmful anyway.
The only way to really protect against USB-based attacks is to not have functional usb ports at all. This is easier on mobile devices because of the built-in software keyboard, and the touch screen mostly removing the need for a mouse, but on a PC you probably need USB for mouse and keyboard, unless you can use PS/2. If you use PS/2, it's not necessarily impossible that a malicious PS/2 device could be programmed to automatically send key strokes and other commands the same way a malicious USB device could, but if your keyboard and mouse are already trusted (and can't be simply unplugged and replaced by some attacker), you can at least prevent USB-based attacks.
When it comes to security, yes, privacyguides.org is just a random site. They are not security experts and aren't really in a position to give proper advice on windows security hardening. You shouldn't really take security advice from a group that recommends using Linux as your desktop OS anyway.
This is technically off-topic, but it's important for you to acknowledge these kinds of things, because bad security advice actually increases risk for you. We don't want people to get lax about their computer usage because they think they're secure when they actually aren't, and we don't want people perpetuating bad security advice and making things worse for other less knowledgeable users either.